The influence of controllability on compensation: a view through data of Major League Baseball

• Published in: International journal of commerce and management Vol. 19; no. 4; pp. 321 - 336
• Main Authors: Ou, Wei-Ming, Wang, Hong-Da
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Bingley Emerald Group Publishing Limited 20.11.2009; Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd
• Subjects: Analysis; Behavior; Compensation; Control; Decision-making; Employee incentives; Employee motivation; Employees; Hypotheses; Impact analysis; Incentive plans; Pay policies; Performance evaluation; Performance related pay; Professional baseball; Profits; Remuneration; Social aspects; Sports; Studies; Variables; Wages; Wages & salaries; United States; United States > US; Pay policies; Remuneration; Performance related pay; Sports
• ISSN: 1056-9219; 2059-6014; 1758-8529; 2059-6022
• DOI: 10.1108/10569210911008494

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the effect of controllability on compensation of Major League Baseball.Design methodology approach - The sample consists of Major League Baseball players who have publicly published compensations figures and who have actively played in the Major Leagues. All data used in the study are publicly available. Multiple regression is employed to test the relationship between player's performance and starting salary of the next season.Findings - The paper proposes that strikeouts, bases on balls, and home runs are relatively controllable for both hitters and pitchers because these performance measures are essentially independent of other teammates' performance.Research limitations implications - The distinctness of professional baseball players by nature may constrain the generalization of this paper. It is recommended that further interpretation of the effects of controllability on compensation for other high-interdependency organizations should be made with caution.Originality value - It is suggested that managers in low-interdependency organizations should make a stronger linkage between subordinates' controllable performance and their compensation. If the compensation plan is designed to maximize the subordinates' reward for performing a controllable task, they will be motivated to expend greater effort on it.