The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive cas...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical explorations Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 106 - 122
Main Author Langsam, Harold
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 02.01.2017
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Between-subjects design
disjunctivism
Hallucinations
intentionalism
naïve realism
Ontology
Perceptions
phenomenal character
Phenomenology
Realism
representationalism
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Summary:Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.
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ISSN:1386-9795
1741-5918
DOI:10.1080/13869795.2016.1222627