Shall we pay all? An experimental test of Random Incentivized Systems

• Published in: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics Vol. 73; pp. 93 - 98
• Main Authors: Clot, Sophie, Grolleau, Gilles, Ibanez, Lisette
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.04.2018
• Subjects: Dictator game; Economics and Finance; Experimental methodology; Humanities and Social Sciences; Random Incentive Systems; Experimental methodology; Random Incentive Systems; Dictator game; experimental methodology; dictator game
• ISSN: 2214-8043; 2214-8051
• DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.01.004

•We test the impact of Between-subjects Random Incentivized Systems on behaviour.•We run a lab experiment based on a standard dictator game.•Results with random payments are similar to results with regular payments.•Hypothetical payment leads to far fewer egoistic players and far more egalitarians.•BRIS are a promising alternative to test hypotheses under logistical and financial constraints. This study seeks to investigate the impact of payment procedures on behaviour in a standard Dictator game. Although the Between-subjects Random Incentivized System (BRIS) is increasingly utilized in experimental economics, its use could be contested from a purely theoretical point of view. In the BRIS, all subjects play the Dictator game, but only a percentage of subjects (e.g., 1 out of 10) are paid. The aim of this article is to test whether the results obtained using this system are consistent with those obtained using a conventional full payment system in which every subject receives payment. An additional, hypothetical treatment is also run. Results show a very similar pattern between the BRIS and the full payment treatment, whereas the hypothetical payment mechanism leads to far fewer egoistic players and far more egalitarians. These findings lend support to the use of BRIS as a valid experimental methodology.