A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums

Summary This paper conducts a laboratory experiment focused on a yes/no referendum in which the outcome is valid only if voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically in particular when the q...

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Published inKyklos (Basel) Vol. 74; no. 1; pp. 19 - 47
Main Author Hizen, Yoichi
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Bern Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.02.2021
Subjects
Abstinence
Experiments
Majority groups
Minority groups
Participation
Policy making
Polls & surveys
Quorum
Referendums
Voter behavior
Voter turnout
Voters
Voting
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Summary:Summary This paper conducts a laboratory experiment focused on a yes/no referendum in which the outcome is valid only if voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically in particular when the quorum is large. In our experiment, subjects are randomly divided into two groups yes and no in advance of voting, and the level of quorum changes round by round. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all subjects go to the polls, and (ii) if the quorum is large, subjects in the ex‐ante majority group go to the polls, whereas subjects in the ex‐ante minority group tend to abstain. As a result, if the quorum is large, it frequently happens that the outcome is rendered invalid because of low voter turnout. Furthermore, when the number of subjects in each referendum increases, subjects of the ex‐ante minority abstain more aggressively, and there arises room for the ex‐post minority to win if the expected number of members is similar between the two groups. Therefore, if policy makers would like to avoid the possibility of strategic abstention, then our results suggest that they should impose either no quorum or only a relatively small quorum which most voters expect will be dwarfed by the actual turnout. If policy makers also care about the possible determination of either yes or no with extremely low voter turnout, as well as strategic abstention, then a relatively small quorum is recommended.
Bibliography:Yoichi Hizen (corresponding author) Professor, School of Economics and Management, Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology, 2‐22 Eikokuji‐cho, Kochi‐shi, Kochi 780‐8515, JAPAN. Email: hizen.yoichi@kochi‐tech.ac.jp. I am grateful to Kentaro Fukumoto, Hideki Konishi, Yukio Maeda, session participants at the 2008 Meeting of the Japanese Association of Electoral Studies, the 2008 Autumn Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association, and the 2013 Asia‐Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association, and seminar participants at the 8th Annual Japan/Irvine Conference, Okayama University, University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Ritsumeikan University, and Kochi University of Technology for their useful comments. I also thank the responsible editor and two anonymous reviewers for their guidance. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. Kazuhito Ogawa and staff members of the Research Institute for Socionetwork Strategies, Kansai University kindly provided me with the opportunity to conduct my experiment. This research is partially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant‐in‐Aid 18730206, 19046001, 17K03769, and the Global COE Program “Sociality of Mind” at Hokkaido University.
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ISSN:0023-5962
1467-6435
DOI:10.1111/kykl.12256