Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abandoned-Bike-Sharing Recycling: Impact of Recycling Subsidy Policy

The launch of large-scale bike sharing in China has effectively met the demand for low-carbon short-distance travel, but it has also led to the emergence of a large number of abandoned bikes, which is called the “bike-sharing siege”. In order to achieve the sustainable development of the bike-sharin...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSustainability Vol. 15; no. 11; p. 8834
Main Authors Liu, Limei, Liu, Zhe, Yang, Yi, Shi, Biao, Liu, Xingbao
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Basel MDPI AG 30.05.2023
Subjects
Behavior
Bicycles
Capitalism
China
Competition
Game theory
Local finance
Local government
Market shares
Parking
Pollution
Product life cycle
Quality of service
Rationality
Recycling
Recycling (Waste, etc.)
Subsidies
Sustainability
Sustainable development
Urban environments
China
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Summary:The launch of large-scale bike sharing in China has effectively met the demand for low-carbon short-distance travel, but it has also led to the emergence of a large number of abandoned bikes, which is called the “bike-sharing siege”. In order to achieve the sustainable development of the bike-sharing industry, this paper discusses how to encourage bike-sharing companies to recycle and reuse abandoned bikes and improve the efficiency of local government financial resources based on the promotion of the EPR system. We apply the evolutionary game to investigate the interaction mechanism of complex behaviors between local governments and bike-sharing companies under two subsidy policies: a fixed recycling subsidy and regressive recycling subsidy. The results show that both recycling subsidy policies have diminishing marginal effects. In addition to incentives, local governments need to unify bike-sharing parking, establish bike-sharing monitoring platforms, and reasonably allocate bike parking spaces to ensure the quality of the urban environment. Under effective regulation, by implementing a regressive recycling subsidy policy and setting a rational amount for the recycling subsidy, local governments can effectively promote the EPR system, strengthen the environmental responsibility of companies, and avoid the “free-rider phenomenon”. Based on the current situation in China, this research provides references for each local government to formulate management policies from the perspective of subsidy policy.
ISSN:2071-1050
2071-1050
DOI:10.3390/su15118834