No bare particulars

There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 158; no. 1; pp. 31 - 41
Main Author Bailey, Andrew M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.03.2012
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Aristotelianism
Bare particulars
Bundle theory
Concept of being
Dissertations & theses
Education
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Identity formation
Instantiation
Legal objections
Mereology
Metaphysics
Nihilism
Ontology
Phenomenological research
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Tomatoes
Substratum
Thin particulars
Bare particulars
Bundle theory
Substance
Particular
Theory
Property
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Summary:There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory— bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, then bare particularism is both unmotivated and false. If they do, then the view faces a problematic—and, I shall argue, false—crowding consequence.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-010-9665-2