Suspended judgment

In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a "yes or no" picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to s...

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Published inPhilosophical studies Vol. 162; no. 2; pp. 165 - 181
Main Author Friedman, Jane
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer 01.01.2013
Springer Netherlands
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Agnosticism
Attitudes
Belief
Belief & doubt
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Judgment
Metaphysics
Mind
Neutrality
Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Political attitudes
Psychological attitudes
Relevant alternatives
Spiders
Truth
Indecision
Belief
Epistemology
Withholding belief
Suspended judgment
Agnosticism
Doxastic attitudes
Analytical Philosophy
Attitude
Epistemology;Philosophy of Science
Neutrality
Judgment
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Summary:In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a "yes or no" picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude.
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ISSN:0031-8116
1573-0883
DOI:10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y