Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-) Fregeanism?

• Published in: Philosophical studies Vol. 154; no. 1; pp. 53 - 78
• Main Author: Balaguer, Mark
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer 01.05.2011; Springer Netherlands; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Direct reference theory; Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Indexicality; Intuition; Linguistic meaning; Metaphysics; Names; Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Predicates; Referentialism; Referents; Saliency; Singular propositions; Truth condition; Truth value; Los Angeles California; New York; Direct reference theory; Belief reports; Factual emptiness; Neo-Fregeanism; Facts of the matter; Propositions; Theory; Reference; Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege
• ISSN: 0031-8116; 1573-0883
• DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9702-9

It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.