Causal complexity demands community coordination

Yarkoni's argument risks skepticism about the very possibility of social science: If social phenomena are too causally complex, normal scientific methods could not possibly untangle them. We argue that the problem of causal complexity is best approached at the level of scientific communities an...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Behavioral and brain sciences Vol. 45; p. e31
Main Authors Sievers, Beau, DeFilippis, Evan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York, USA Cambridge University Press 10.02.2022
Subjects
Critical thinking
Open Peer Commentary
Prediction markets
Scientists
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Summary:Yarkoni's argument risks skepticism about the very possibility of social science: If social phenomena are too causally complex, normal scientific methods could not possibly untangle them. We argue that the problem of causal complexity is best approached at the level of scientific communities and institutions, not the modeling practices of individual scientists.
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ISSN:0140-525X
1469-1825
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X21000418