Research on Dynamic Optimization and Coordination Strategy of Value Co-Creation in Digital Innovation Ecosystems
Based on the theory of differential games and guided by the realization of value co-creation, this paper discusses the value co-creation of a technology innovation platform, scientific innovation layer, and support layer in the digital innovation ecosystem. Given the dynamic change characteristics o...
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Published in | Sustainability Vol. 15; no. 9; p. 7616 |
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Main Authors | , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Basel
MDPI AG
01.05.2023
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Based on the theory of differential games and guided by the realization of value co-creation, this paper discusses the value co-creation of a technology innovation platform, scientific innovation layer, and support layer in the digital innovation ecosystem. Given the dynamic change characteristics of digital technology innovation and resource integration, this paper constructs a differential game decision model. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The Stackelberg master–slave game and collaborative model have incentive effects. The returns in both methods increase over time and finally reach a stable value. In the collaborative game model, the effort level of participants is the highest and realizes the Pareto optimality. (2) The digital technology innovation capacity coefficient, digital technology assimilation capacity and absorption capacity coefficient, and resource integration cost coefficient are the key factors affecting the optimal return of the innovation ecosystem. (3) The two-way cost-sharing path can balance the innovation ecosystem, in which the technology innovation platform shares the cost and provides incentives to the scientific innovation layer and the support layer. The sharing ratio and incentive degree are positively correlated with the benefit of value co-creation. However, if the income distribution coefficient is not appropriately set, the participants’ income will decrease. |
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ISSN: | 2071-1050 2071-1050 |
DOI: | 10.3390/su15097616 |