IS MY FEELING YOUR PAIN BAD FOR OTHERS? EMPATHY AS VIRTUE VERSUS EMPATHY AS FIXED TRAIT

• Published in: Zygon Vol. 52; no. 1; pp. 232 - 257
• Main Author: Peterson, Gregory R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge Open Library of Humanities 01.03.2017
• Subjects: Cognition & reasoning; cognitive empathy; dual processing; emotional empathy; Emotions; Empathy; Experiments; Jesse Prinz; moral psychology; Morality; Paul Bloom; Theory of mind; virtue; Paul Bloom; moral psychology; emotional empathy; Jesse Prinz; virtue; cognitive empathy; dual processing
• ISSN: 0591-2385; 1467-9744; 1467-9744
• DOI: 10.1111/zygo.12330

The purpose of this article is to (1) critique the primary arguments given by Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz against empathy, and (2) to argue instead that empathy is best understood as a virtue that plays an important but complicated role in the moral life. That it is a virtue does not mean that it always functions well, and empathy sometimes contributes to behavior that is partial and unfair. In some of their writings, both Bloom and Prinz endorse the view that empathy is a fixed trait, but there is little reason to think this, and the studies that they cite do not support this view. Further, a number of recent studies suggest the opposite: our empathic reactions are malleable and subject to environmental effects and learning. Although our capacities for cognitive and emotional empathy are clearly not sufficient for being moral, I argue that they are functionally necessary traits that, like other virtues, must be cultivated correctly.