A Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism and discharge guidance strategy for private electric vehicles for distribution systems load restoration

• Published in: International journal of electrical power & energy systems Vol. 159; p. 110023
• Main Authors: Wang, Xihao, Wang, Xiaojun, Liu, Zhao, Wang, Weixin, Sun, Qingkai, Pan, Aiqiang, Dou, Jiaming
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Ltd 01.08.2024; Elsevier
• Subjects: Discharge guidance; Distribution system load restoration; Incentive mechanism; Private electric vehicles; Stackelberg game; Incentive mechanism; Stackelberg game; Distribution system load restoration; Private electric vehicles; Discharge guidance
• ISSN: 0142-0615
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2024.110023

•A Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism embedded with a discharge guidance strategy for Private Electric Vehicles (PREVs) is proposed, enhancing the PREVs participation in load restoration of distribution system.•The V2G Station Operator (VSO)’s discharge guidance strategy for PREVs is modelled as an optimization problem using Huff attraction model, accounting for PREV user destination choice behaviors and preferences.•A Stackelberg game model is constructed to achieve an equilibrium of interests among multi-stakeholder and ultimately achieve load restoration. The uniqueness of the game equilibrium solution is proved.•The restoration results under different strategies, preference coefficients and electric vehicle response rates are investigated. Effectively utilizing large-scale Private Electric Vehicles (PREVs) in load restoration can enhance the capability of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to respond to accidental power outages. However, the challenge remains in incentivizing and guiding PREVs to participate in load restoration. This paper proposes a Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism, with a V2G Station Operator (VSO) discharge guidance model based on the Huff attraction model embedded to address this challenge. The VSO is introduced to manage the issue of PREVs having small individual capacities, and not meeting the criteria for direct participation in electricity markets. Firstly, a framework for involving PREVs in load restoration is introduced, clarifying the responsibilities of PREVs, VSO, DSO, and Distribution Market Operator (DMO), as well as the interrelation of incentive mechanism and discharge guidance strategy. Secondly, models for each game participant are established. The VSO encapsulates the discharge guidance strategy into an optimization model using the Huff attraction-based model that captures the destination choice probabilities of PREVs, and the DSO develops a load restoration model. Thirdly, a Stackelberg game model is established with the DMO as the leader and VSO and DSO as followers. The existence and uniqueness of the proposed Stackelberg game’s equilibrium solution are proven, and a distributed iterative algorithm is employed for the solution. Finally, numerical simulations are performed with the IEEE 33-bus distribution system and a simplified road network to validate the proposed strategy’s effectiveness in guiding PREVs’ participation in load restoration, enhancing the restoration capability of the DSO, and improving the economic efficiency of each participant.