Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent sch...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economics & management strategy Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 138 - 152
Main Author Katz, Michael L.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 2019
Subjects
Antitrust
antitrust enforcement
Enforcement
platform economics
rebuttable presumption
Supreme courts
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Summary:Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms.
Bibliography:I testified as the government's economic expert in
United States v. American Express and United States v. Visa USA, Inc
This note does not draw on any confidential materials from either matter. I am grateful to Julian Wright and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful comments.
ISSN:1058-6407
1530-9134
DOI:10.1111/jems.12304