An empirical investigation of governance mechanism choices in service outsourcing

• Published in: International journal of operations & production management Vol. 42; no. 9; pp. 1467 - 1496
• Main Authors: Ye, Yuan, Peng, Xiaosong (david), Fan, Raymond Lei, Narayanan, Arunachalam
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Bradford Emerald Publishing Limited 12.08.2022; Emerald Group Publishing Limited
• Subjects: Ambiguity; Business metrics; Costs; Data collection; Data processing; Empirical analysis; Hypotheses; Information processing; Monitoring; Multivariate statistical analysis; Outsourcing; Structural equation modeling; Task complexity; Transportation services; Service outsourcing; Task complexity; Measurement ambiguity; Contract specificity; Monitoring
• ISSN: 0144-3577; 1758-6593
• DOI: 10.1108/IJOPM-01-2022-0025

PurposeDrawing on transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and organizational information processing theory (OIPT), this study investigates how the alignments between the characteristics of service (i.e. task complexity and measurement ambiguity) and governance mechanisms (i.e. contract specificity and monitoring) can affect service performance.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a rigorously designed survey to collect data from professionals who manage service outsourcing contracts in various industries. The respondent pool consists of randomly selected members of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM). The authors’ research question is analyzed using 261 completed and useable responses. Structural equation modeling is adopted to examine the data and test the proposed hypotheses.FindingsThe authors find that both contract specificity and monitoring have a positive impact on supplier performance. Further, for high task complexity services, contract specificity is more effective than monitoring, and for high measurement ambiguity services, the opposite is true. Moreover, the effect of contract specificity is mediated by monitoring.Practical implicationsService outsourcers should use both contract specificity and monitoring in governing outsourced services and know that the former depends on the latter during execution. Facing resource constraints, they can prioritize crafting detailed contract provisions over implementing monitoring for highly complex services but consider monitoring as the primary governance tool in services whose outcomes are difficult to measure.Originality/valueThis study is the first to couple TCE with OPIT and consider the nature of outsourced services in the choice of governance mechanisms and empirically test the simultaneous effects of contract specificity and monitoring in the context of service outsourcing.