The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts

• Published in: European journal of operational research Vol. 280; no. 3; pp. 926 - 939
• Main Authors: Zhao, Ju, Zhou, Yong-Wu, Cao, Zong-Hong, Min, Jie
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier B.V 01.02.2020
• Subjects: Consignment contract; Pricing competition; Retailer-dominated supply chain; Shelf space competition; Supply chain management; Retailer-dominated supply chain; Supply chain management; Pricing competition; Shelf space competition; Consignment contract
• ISSN: 0377-2217; 1872-6860
• DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.074

•Develop a shelf space/pricing model for a supply chain under consignment contract.•Present parties’ equilibrium strategies under manufacturers’ three horizontal scenarios.•Reveal impacts of manufacturers’ cost difference and moving sequence on equilibrium.•Investigate under what conditions two manufacturers’ horizontal collusion can happen.•Vertical integration may be detrimental to the whole chain under consignment contract. Consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a dominant retailer, such as big supermarkets like Walmart. Under a consignment contract with revenue sharing, the two manufacturers sell through the retailer two substitutable products whose demands are dependent on their shelf space and sales prices. The two manufacturers may compete horizontally for shelf space and pricing by three scenarios: Nash game, Stackelberg game, and collusion, and play vertically the retailer-Stackelberg game with the retailer. For each of these horizontal scenarios, we present all participators’ equilibrium strategies and their corresponding profits, based on which the impacts of manufacturers’ cost difference and moving sequence are investigated. Additionally, we discuss whether a horizontal collusion among manufacturers occurs when they choose their scenarios and whether centralization is always beneficial for the entire chain under the considered consignment contract. The study reveals the following results: (i) When the manufacturers compete horizontally, the high-cost manufacturer always sets a high-price and less shelf space strategy, while the low-cost manufacturer always adopts a low-price and more shelf space strategy, which is not affected by their moving sequence. If they collude horizontally, it is just reverse. (ii) When the two manufacturers compete horizontally, all participators’ equilibrium strategies and their corresponding profits are significantly influenced by manufacturers’ moving sequence. (iii) A horizontal collusion between the manufacturers can occur only when their cost difference is relatively small; this finding supplements existing literature. (iv) When the cost difference between manufacturers is relatively big, then centralization may be detrimental to the entire chain, which can explain why several supply chains adopt vertical competition strategies in practice. In addition, we find that these results still hold for the limited shelf space scenario and shelf-space limitation enhances the horizontal and vertical competition intensity by increasing shelf space fee.