A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

We propose a two-person game-theoretical model to study information sharing decisions at an interim stage when information is incomplete. The two agents have pieces of private information about the state of nature, and that information is improved by combining the pieces. Agents are both senders and...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational journal of game theory Vol. 34; no. 3; pp. 425 - 442
Main Author Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Heidelberg Springer Nature B.V 01.10.2006
Subjects
Access to information
Asymmetric information
Collective action
Economic equilibrium
Economic incentives
Economic models
Equilibrium
Game theory
Information sharing
Knowledge transfer
Pay-off
Payoffs
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We propose a two-person game-theoretical model to study information sharing decisions at an interim stage when information is incomplete. The two agents have pieces of private information about the state of nature, and that information is improved by combining the pieces. Agents are both senders and receivers of information. There is an institutional arrangement that fixes a transfer of wealth from an agent who lies about her private information. In our model, we show that (1) there is a positive relation between information revelation and the amount of the transfers, and (2) information revelation has a collective action structure, in particular, the incentives of an agent to reveal decrease with respect to the amount of information disclosed by the other.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0020-7276
1432-1270
DOI:10.1007/s00182-006-0021-x