Multi-Subject Decision-Making Analysis in the Public Opinion of Emergencies: From an Evolutionary Game Perspective

• Published in: Mathematics (Basel) Vol. 13; no. 10; p. 1547
• Main Authors: Guo, Chen, Song, Yinghua
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.05.2025
• Subjects: Behavior; Collaboration; Communication; Decision making; Effectiveness; Emergency management; Equilibrium; evolutionary game; False information; Game theory; Incentives; Influence; Information dissemination; Literature reviews; Management of crises; multi-subject decision-making; Public opinion; public opinion of emergencies; Sensitivity analysis; Simulation methods; Stakeholders; China
• ISSN: 2227-7390; 2227-7390
• DOI: 10.3390/math13101547

This study employs evolutionary game theory to analyze the tripartite interaction among government regulators, media publishers, and self-media participants in emergency public opinion management. We establish an evolutionary game model incorporating strategic motivations and key influencing factors; then, we validate the model through systematic simulations. Key findings demonstrate the following: ① the system exhibits dual stable equilibria: regulated equilibrium and autonomous equilibrium. ② Sensitivity analysis identifies critical dynamics: ① self-media behavior is primarily driven by penalty avoidance (g3) and losses (w2); ② media participation hinges on revenue incentives (m2) versus regulatory burdens (k); ③ government intervention efficacy diminishes on emergencies when resistance (v1 + v3) exceeds control benefits. The study reveals that effective governance requires the following: ① adaptive parameter tuning of punishment–reward mechanisms; ② dynamic coordination between information control and market incentives. This framework advances emergency management by quantifying how micro-level interactions shape macro-level opinion evolution, providing actionable insights for balancing stability and information freedom in digital governance.