Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces

Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201-218, 1979) proved that majority rule on any proper permutation closed j-rich ballot space is the only social choice function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, and neutrality. Alós-Ferrer (Soc Choi...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSocial choice and welfare Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 639 - 655
Main Authors Leach, Trevor, Powers, Robert C.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin/Heidelberg Springer 01.04.2020
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Ballots
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Function
Game Theory
International Political Economy
Majority rule
Neutrality
Original Paper
Public Finance
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social choice
Social Policy
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Summary:Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201-218, 1979) proved that majority rule on any proper permutation closed j-rich ballot space is the only social choice function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, and neutrality. Alós-Ferrer (Soc Choice Welf 27:621-625, 2006) showed that neutrality was not needed for Fishburn's result as long as the ballot space has no restriction on ballot sizes. In this paper, we show that the Alós-Ferrer result can be extended to a much larger class of ballot spaces.
ISSN:0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI:10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4