Structural Budget Balance as a Fiscal Rule in the European Union—Good, Bad, or Ugly?

The EU's Fiscal Compact requires member states to legislate structural budget balance rule(s) (SBR). We use elite interviews and government documents from Austria, Ireland, and Portugal to assess the extent to which SBRs are perceived to have resulted in improved accountability, coordination, a...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic budgeting & finance Vol. 41; no. 1; pp. 121 - 141
Main Authors Raudla, Ringa, Douglas, James W.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Malden Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01.03.2021
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Accountability
Coordination
Elite (Social sciences)
Government finance
Government publications
Legislation
Ownership
Political elites
Public officials
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Summary:The EU's Fiscal Compact requires member states to legislate structural budget balance rule(s) (SBR). We use elite interviews and government documents from Austria, Ireland, and Portugal to assess the extent to which SBRs are perceived to have resulted in improved accountability, coordination, and credible commitment on the part of elected officials. We find that establishing the SBRs in legislation has not resulted in domestic ownership on the part of the member states. Furthermore, SBRs do not appear to have improved accountability due to questions about their accuracy. There is some evidence that SBRs aid finance ministries' coordination efforts.
ISSN:0275-1100
1540-5850
DOI:10.1111/pbaf.12279