Oil prices and interstate conflict

Anecdotal evidence suggests that high oil prices embolden oil-rich states to behave more aggressively. This article contends that arguments linking oil-exporter status to interstate conflict are implicitly price contingent, and tests this via a reanalysis of works by Colgan and Weeks. It finds a con...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inConflict management and peace science Vol. 34; no. 6; pp. 575 - 596
Main Author Hendrix, Cullen S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England SAGE 01.11.2017
SAGE Publications
Sage Publications Ltd
Subjects
Coercion
Diplomacy
Disputes
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
Petroleum
Prices
Venezuela
diplomacy
oil
Iran
Conflict
resource curse
Russia
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Summary:Anecdotal evidence suggests that high oil prices embolden oil-rich states to behave more aggressively. This article contends that arguments linking oil-exporter status to interstate conflict are implicitly price contingent, and tests this via a reanalysis of works by Colgan and Weeks. It finds a contingent effect of oil prices on interstate disputes, with high oil prices associated with significant increases in dispute behavior in petrostates, for which oil exports constitute more than 10% of GDP, while having a null effect in non-petrostates. Directed-dyadic tests indicate that this is due to petrostates initiating disputes, rather than becoming more attractive targets for conquest or coercion.
ISSN:0738-8942
1549-9219
DOI:10.1177/0738894215606067