Debt-for-climate swaps: Killing two birds with one stone?

•When debt is unsustainable, deep and wide debt restructuring should be the main focus.•When debt is high but sustainable, swaps can transfer resources for climate purposes.•In middle-income countries, swaps can consider supporting mitigation measures.•But in low-income countries, debt swaps must pr...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGlobal environmental change Vol. 71; p. 102407
Main Authors Essers, Dennis, Cassimon, Danny, Prowse, Martin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Ltd 01.11.2021
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Summary:•When debt is unsustainable, deep and wide debt restructuring should be the main focus.•When debt is high but sustainable, swaps can transfer resources for climate purposes.•In middle-income countries, swaps can consider supporting mitigation measures.•But in low-income countries, debt swaps must prioritize adaptation investments.•The governance context and creditor incentives, such as reputation, require attention. The COVID-19 pandemic has further fuelled problems of debt sustainability in developing countries and has sapped the fiscal resources needed to finance climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. We examine whether “debt-for-climate” swaps, instruments whereby debtor countries are relieved from their contractual debt obligations in return for local climate-related spending commitments, may be helpful in tackling worrying debt levels and climate concerns simultaneously. We point out that debt swaps do not have a great historical track record but that common flaws such as their piecemeal nature, lack of additionality and creation of parallel implementation structures, could be overcome by scaling up and careful design. To realize swaps’ full potential, a distinction needs to be made between situations where debt is clearly unsustainable and where it is high but sustainable. In the former case, deep and comprehensive debt restructuring should be the primary focus, rather than closely matching debt service savings with increased climate spending; in the latter case, stand-alone debt swaps may be used to transfer resources from creditors to debtor countries that are committed to climate investments but lack fiscal space. Another helpful differentiation is that between middle-income debtor countries, where debt swaps could finance climate mitigation interventions, and low-income debtors, where investments in adaption deserve prioritization. Finally, debt swap proposals need to be mindful of creditor incentives, including positive reputational payoffs, achieving greater scale using a multi-creditor set-up, at the same time as carefully considering governance credentials in each country context.
ISSN:0959-3780
1872-9495
DOI:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2021.102407