Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as obje...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 204; no. 2; p. 70
Main Author García-Carpintero, Manuel
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 06.08.2024
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Education
Episodic memory
Epistemology
Evans, Gareth
Identification
Logic
Memory
Metaphysics
Original Research
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Self-knowledge
First-personal reference
Memory
attitudes
Immunity to error through misidentification
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ISSN1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI10.1007/s11229-024-04664-2

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Summary:Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions.
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ISSN:1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-024-04664-2