How quality reporting reduces accountability deficit and overload

A critical issue in public accountability is how to reduce chances for dysfunctionalities. This research addresses it by examining both theoretically and empirically how quality reporting may reduce accountability deficit and overload in a multi-principal setting. Analyses of data from the Program A...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPublic management review Vol. 24; no. 12; pp. 2079 - 2100
Main Authors Han, Yousueng, Tang, Shui Yan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 02.12.2022
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Accountability
conflict management
Decision making
Deficits
performance management
Ratings & rankings
reporting quality
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Summary:A critical issue in public accountability is how to reduce chances for dysfunctionalities. This research addresses it by examining both theoretically and empirically how quality reporting may reduce accountability deficit and overload in a multi-principal setting. Analyses of data from the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) during the Bush Administration show that programs exhibiting higher reporting quality attained higher performance ratings, which, in turn, led to larger budgetary recommendations. Higher reporting quality also helped reduce the differences between presidential and congressional budgetary decisions. This article contributes to developing a contingent, process-based theory of public accountability.
ISSN:1471-9037
1471-9045
DOI:10.1080/14719037.2021.1963823