Truth, topicality, and transparency: one-component versus two-component semantics

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) sem...

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Published inLinguistics and philosophy Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 481 - 503
Main Authors Hawke, Peter, Hornischer, Levin, Berto, Francesco
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.06.2024
Springer Nature B.V
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Summary:When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.
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ISSN:0165-0157
1573-0549
DOI:10.1007/s10988-023-09408-y