The dialectics of accuracy arguments for probabilism

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 201; no. 5; p. 153
• Main Author: Pruss, Alexander R.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 24.04.2023; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Accuracy; Cognition & reasoning; Dialectics; Education; Epistemology; Logic; Metaphysics; Original Research; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Pragmatics; Probability; Probability; Bayesianism; Accuracy; Scoring rules; Probabilism
• ISSN: 1573-0964; 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04145-y

Scoring rules measure the deviation between a credence assignment and reality. Probabilism holds that only those credence assignments that satisfy the axioms of probability are rationally admissible. Accuracy-based arguments for probabilism observe that given certain conditions on a scoring rule, the score of any non-probability is dominated by the score of a probability. The conditions in the arguments we will consider include propriety: the claim that the expected accuracy of p is not beaten by the expected accuracy of any other credence c by the lights of p if p is a probability. I argue that if we think through how a non-probabilist can respond to pragmatic arguments for probabilism, we will expect the non-probabilist to accept a condition stronger than propriety for the same reasons that the probabilist gives for propriety, but this stronger condition is incompatible with the other conditions that the probabilist needs to run the accuracy argument. This makes it unlikely for the probabilist’s argument to be compelling.