Impact of Government Environmental Regulations on Remanufacturing Supply Chain with Multi-Subject Responsibility for Recycling and Disposal

• Published in: Mathematics (Basel) Vol. 11; no. 8; p. 1780
• Main Authors: Jiang, Xiao, Hu, Qiang, Lou, Tingyuan, Zuo, Wenjin, Li, Jicai
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Basel MDPI AG 01.04.2023
• Subjects: Analysis; Appliances; Business-government relations; Carbon; Consumers; Decision making; Decisions; Electric vehicles; Environmental aspects; Environmental protection; Equilibrium; Fees & charges; Game theory; government environmental regulations; Government regulations; Government subsidies; Laws, regulations and rules; Liability; Optimization; Recycling; recycling and disposal; Refuse and refuse disposal; Regulation; Remanufacturing; remanufacturing supply chain; Responsibility; Stackelberg game; Supply chains; tripartite liability system; China; United States > US; Japan
• ISSN: 2227-7390; 2227-7390
• DOI: 10.3390/math11081780

With the emergence of a large number of waste electronic products and the enhancement of social awareness of environmental protection, the recycling of waste electronic products has become one of the pressing issues of social concern. Government environmental regulation is an important policy to promote the development of the remanufacturing industry. In this paper, we study the government levies recycling and disposal fees on original products for environmental governance and establish two game models based on the perspective of maximizing social welfare with no government regulation and a tripartite liability system. The optimal decisions on wholesale, retail prices and quantity of original and remanufactured products, as well as the recycling and disposal fee are analyzed under both models. Based on the numerical results, the impact of the main parameter (such as the responsibility sharing ratio) on the decisions and profits of the parties is discussed. The results show that (1) the wholesale and retail prices of remanufactured products are not affected by government regulation; (2) the tripartite liability system can increase the output of remanufactured products and reduce the output of original products while cutting the profits of remanufacturing supply chain members, and increasing social welfare; (3) government’s optimal recycling and disposal fee is not related to the sharing ratio. The study can provide practitioners with suggestions for ways to develop environmental regulation.