Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption

We address the question of whether or not semantically secure public-key encryption primitives imply the existence of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure primitives. We show a black-box separation, following the methodology introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich [23], for a large non-trivial class o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheory of Cryptography pp. 434 - 455
Main Authors Gertner, Yael, Malkin, Tal, Myers, Steven
Format Book Chapter
LanguageEnglish
Published Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Subjects
Challenge Ciphertext
Choose Ciphertext Attack
Decryption Algorithm
Decryption Oracle
Semantic Security
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Summary:We address the question of whether or not semantically secure public-key encryption primitives imply the existence of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure primitives. We show a black-box separation, following the methodology introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich [23], for a large non-trivial class of constructions. In particular, we show that if the proposed CCA construction’s decryption algorithm does not query the semantically secure primitive’s encryption algorithm, then the proposed construction cannot be CCA secure.
ISBN:9783540709350
3540709355
ISSN:0302-9743
1611-3349
DOI:10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_24