Large Tullock contests

We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of economics (Vienna, Austria) Vol. 140; no. 2; pp. 169 - 179
Main Authors Doğan, Serhat, Karagözoğlu, Emin, Keskin, Kerim, Sağlam, Çağrı
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Vienna Springer Vienna 01.10.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Design
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Equilibrium
Game Theory
Games
Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics
Microeconomics
Public Finance
Random variables
Social and Behav. Sciences
Success
D74
D47
Large game
Contest design
Tullock contests
Asymmetric contest
Effort-maximizing contests
C72
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Summary:We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-maximizing large Tullock contest. It is shown that the contest designer needs to increase the curvature of the effective effort function, thereby encouraging high-type agents to exert even higher efforts, as the curvature of the effort cost function increases or the support of the type distribution gets narrower.
ISSN:0931-8658
1617-7134
DOI:10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8