Blockchain-Based Certificate Transparency and Revocation Transparency

• Published in: IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing Vol. 19; no. 1; pp. 681 - 697
• Main Authors: Wang, Ze, Lin, Jingqiang, Cai, Quanwei, Wang, Qiongxiao, Zha, Daren, Jing, Jiwu
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Washington IEEE 01.01.2022; IEEE Computer Society
• Subjects: Blockchain; Browsers; certificate revocation; certificate transparency; Certificates; Cooperative control; Cryptography; Public key; public key infrastructure; Publishing; Security management; Servers; trust management; Web servers
• ISSN: 1545-5971; 1941-0018
• DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2020.2983022

Traditional X.509 public key infrastructures (PKIs) depend on trusted certification authorities (CAs) to sign certificates, used in SSL/TLS to authenticate web servers and establish secure channels. However, recent security incidents indicate that CAs may (be compromised to) sign fraudulent certificates. In this article, we propose blockchain-based certificate transparency (CT) and revocation transparency (RT) to balance the absolute authority of CAs. Our scheme is compatible with X.509 PKIs but significantly reinforces the security guarantees of a certificate. The CA-signed certificates and their revocation status information of an SSL/TLS web server are published by the subject (i.e., the web server) as a transaction in the global certificate blockchain. The certificate blockchain acts as append-only public logs to monitor CAs' certificate signing and revocation operations, and an SSL/TLS web server is granted with the cooperative control on its certificates. A browser compares the certificate received in SSL/TLS negotiations with the ones in the public certificate blockchain, and accepts it only if it is published and not revoked. We implement the prototype system with Firefox and Nginx, and the experimental results show that it introduces reasonable overheads.