Correspondence: NATO Non-expansion and German Reunification
In "Deal or No Deal," Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson sheds new light on an important case. At the article's core is a clear historical question: Did U.S. leaders offer to limit NATO expansion in 1990? Shifrinson provides substantial evidence that they did, proposing a quid pro quo that c...
Saved in:
Published in | International security Vol. 41; no. 3; pp. 197 - 200 |
---|---|
Main Authors | , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
One Rogers Street, Cambridge, MA 02142-1209, USA
MIT Press
01.01.2017
MIT Press Journals, The |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | In "Deal or No Deal," Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson sheds new light on an important case. At the article's core is a clear historical question: Did U.S. leaders offer to limit NATO expansion in 1990? Shifrinson provides substantial evidence that they did, proposing a quid pro quo that convinced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to accept German reunification within NATO. The article frames its modern relevance by conflict that historical question with distinct causal and moral questions, however, distorting its contribution and undermining its policy recommendations. |
---|---|
Bibliography: | Winter, 2016/17 2020-06-24T22:50:29+10:00 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2017: 197-200 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2017, 197-200 Informit, Melbourne (Vic) |
ISSN: | 0162-2889 1531-4804 |
DOI: | 10.1162/ISEC_c_00270 |