Correspondence: NATO Non-expansion and German Reunification

In "Deal or No Deal," Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson sheds new light on an important case. At the article's core is a clear historical question: Did U.S. leaders offer to limit NATO expansion in 1990? Shifrinson provides substantial evidence that they did, proposing a quid pro quo that c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational security Vol. 41; no. 3; pp. 197 - 200
Main Authors Maass, Richard W., Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published One Rogers Street, Cambridge, MA 02142-1209, USA MIT Press 01.01.2017
MIT Press Journals, The
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Summary:In "Deal or No Deal," Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson sheds new light on an important case. At the article's core is a clear historical question: Did U.S. leaders offer to limit NATO expansion in 1990? Shifrinson provides substantial evidence that they did, proposing a quid pro quo that convinced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to accept German reunification within NATO. The article frames its modern relevance by conflict that historical question with distinct causal and moral questions, however, distorting its contribution and undermining its policy recommendations.
Bibliography:Winter, 2016/17
2020-06-24T22:50:29+10:00
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2017: 197-200
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2017, 197-200
Informit, Melbourne (Vic)
ISSN:0162-2889
1531-4804
DOI:10.1162/ISEC_c_00270