Game Scheduling for Vehicle Platoons at Autonomous Intersection Accommodating Priority Passage Requests

• Published in: IEEE access Vol. 12; pp. 67149 - 67160
• Main Authors: Hu, Haiyang, Peng, Feng
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Piscataway IEEE 2024; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Autonomous intersection; baseline payoff; Computational modeling; Effectiveness; game scheduling; Game theory; Games; Job shop scheduling; Kernel functions; Nash equilibrium; Optimal scheduling; priority passage request; Priority scheduling; Schedules; Scheduling; Strategy; vehicle platoon
• ISSN: 2169-3536; 2169-3536
• DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3393640

Addressing the human-centric needs in vehicle scheduling at intersections poses a significant challenge. In this paper, we propose a game scheduling method to address the problem of platoon scheduling while considering priority passage requests. Firstly, we construct a coalition game-based platoon scheduling model. Within this model, a kernel function searches for the optimal coalition group within the kernel set to ensure that participants, such as platoons, gain higher payoffs by joining the coalition than they would individually. The coalition payoff function determines the optimal passage order. Secondly, we design a baseline strategy where the payoff and action obtained by the priority passage platoon in the coalition game serve as the baseline values. Finally, based on this strategy, we develop a bargaining game model where the priority passage platoon acts as the bargainer, while other platoons act as the other party, with baseline payoff and action serving as constraints. The Nash equilibrium identifies the optimal passage order for the priority passage platoon. We conduct 3 experiments: experiment 1 evaluates the effectiveness of the coalition game model; experiment 2 tests the effectiveness of the bargaining game model; and experiment 3 assesses the effectiveness of the game scheduling method in reducing vehicle travel costs and compares it with existing methods. The results demonstrate that our proposed game scheduling method not only reduces the travel costs of the priority passage platoon but also minimizes its impact on other vehicles to the greatest extent possible.