Logical Cornestones of Judaic Argumentation Theory

• Published in: Argumentation Vol. 27; no. 3; pp. 305 - 326
• Main Author: Schumann, Andrew
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.08.2013; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Cognition & reasoning; Communication Studies; Education; Judaism; Legal History; Logic; Philosophy; Philosophy of Law; Political Communication; Theology; Theories of Law; Judaic inference rules; Judaic pragmatic-syllogistics
• ISSN: 0920-427X; 1572-8374
• DOI: 10.1007/s10503-012-9273-8

In this paper, the four Judaic inference rules: qal wa- ḥ omer , gezerah š awah , heqe š , binyan ’av are considered from the logical point of view and the pragmatic limits of applying these rules are symbolic-logically explicated. According to the Talmudic sages, on the one hand, after applying some inference rules we cannot apply other inference rules. These rules are weak. On the other hand, there are rules after which we can apply any other. These rules are strong. This means that Judaic inference rules have different pragmatic meanings and this fact differs Judaic logic from other ones. The Judaic argumentation theory built up on Judaic logic also contains pragmatic limits for proofs as competitive communication when different Rabbis claim different opinions in respect to the same subject. In order to define these limits we build up a special kind of syllogistics, the so-called Judaic pragmatic-syllogistics, where it is defined whose opinion should be choosen in a dispute.