Consortium Blockchain for Secure Resource Sharing in Vehicular Edge Computing: A Contract-Based Approach

Vehicular edge computing (VEC) extends edge computing to vehicular networks by exploiting computation resources of vehicles to offload tasks from other vehicles and pedestrians. However, VEC faces several critical challenges such as the potential security issues caused by untrusted and opaque enviro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIEEE transactions on network science and engineering Vol. 8; no. 2; pp. 1189 - 1201
Main Authors Wang, Siming, Ye, Dongdong, Huang, Xumin, Yu, Rong, Wang, Yongjian, Zhang, Yan
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Piscataway IEEE 01.04.2021
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subjects
Blockchain
Computation offloading
Consortia
Consortium blockchain
contract-based incentive mechanism
Contracts
Cryptography
Delays
Edge computing
Expected utility
Fault tolerance
Pedestrians
Resource management
resource sharing
Security
Task analysis
Vehicles
vehicular edge computing
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Summary:Vehicular edge computing (VEC) extends edge computing to vehicular networks by exploiting computation resources of vehicles to offload tasks from other vehicles and pedestrians. However, VEC faces several critical challenges such as the potential security issues caused by untrusted and opaque environment and the lack of incentive mechanism under asymmetric information scenario. To solve the above challenges, we propose a consortium blockchain for secure resource sharing in VEC. We first design multi-step smart contracts to achieve secure resource sharing and defend against the malicious behaviours of service requesters and vehicles with selfish purposes. Then, a byzantine fault tolerance-based proof-of-stake (BFT-based PoS) consensus protocol is applied in consortium blockchain to reach consensus efficiently. Furthermore, we design a contract-based incentive mechanism to motivate vehicles to share their computation resources with service requesters. The optimal contracts are derived to maximize the service requesters' expected utility as well as social welfare. Finally, simulation results demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanism is more effective and efficient than the traditional schemes.
ISSN:2327-4697
2334-329X
DOI:10.1109/TNSE.2020.3004475