Foucauldian Power and Schmittian Politics The Craft of Constitution

A political pattern of power focused on defining enemies of the state permits administrative agencies to be grounded in framework that allows them to create meaning. In an effort to better understand how agencies act as political players in a web of power relationships, this article suggests a frame...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAdministration & society Vol. 43; no. 5; pp. 537 - 560
Main Author Newswander, Chad B.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.07.2011
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Agency
Constitutions
Foucault, Michel
Government agencies
Management
Political Power
Political structure
Political theory
Politics
Power
Public administration
Schmitt, Carl
Studies
politics
administrative theory
constitutive
power
Schmitt
Foucault
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Summary:A political pattern of power focused on defining enemies of the state permits administrative agencies to be grounded in framework that allows them to create meaning. In an effort to better understand how agencies act as political players in a web of power relationships, this article suggests a framework based jointly on Foucault’s concept of power and Schmitt’s understanding of the political. Although these models may at first appear to be incompatible, Foucault and Schmitt’s ideas on power and politics are in fact complementary, and together can enrich an understanding of how administration is deeply constitutive.
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ISSN:0095-3997
1552-3039
DOI:10.1177/0095399711412735