Experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy

Contemporary experimental philosophers sometimes use versions of an argument from the history of philosophy to defend the claim that what they do is philosophy. Although experimental philosophers conduct surveys and carry out what appear to be experiments in psychology, making them methodologically...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inBritish journal for the history of philosophy Vol. 26; no. 5; pp. 829 - 849
Main Author Sorell, Tom
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Routledge 03.09.2018
Subjects
Descartes
empirically informed philosophy
Experimental philosophy
Hobbes
naturalistic philosophy
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Summary:Contemporary experimental philosophers sometimes use versions of an argument from the history of philosophy to defend the claim that what they do is philosophy. Although experimental philosophers conduct surveys and carry out what appear to be experiments in psychology, making them methodologically different from most analytic philosophers working today, techniques like theirs were not out of the ordinary in the philosophy of the past, early modern philosophy in particular. Or so some of them (Knobe, Nichols, Sytsma and Livengood) argue. This paper disputes the argument, citing important differences between early modern philosopher-scientists - Descartes, Hobbes and Boyle - and their supposed modern counterparts. Although there is some continuity between early modern philosopher-scientists and the contemporary experimentalists, it is mostly a continuity of interest in empirically informed philosophy, not a distinctively experimental philosophy.
ISSN:0960-8788
1469-3526
DOI:10.1080/09608788.2017.1320971