Which Kind of Body in “Mental” Pathologies? Phenomenological Insights on the Nature of the Disrupted Self

• Published in: The Journal of medicine and philosophy Vol. 48; no. 2; pp. 116 - 127
• Main Author: Bizzari, Valeria
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: US Oxford University Press 20.04.2023
• Subjects: Autism Spectrum Disorder; Humans; therapeutic relationship; dyssynchrony; disembodiment; mental pathology; hyperembodiment
• ISSN: 0360-5310; 1744-5019; 1744-5019
• DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jhad008

Abstract Guided by a phenomenological perspective, this paper aims to account for the existence of a corporeal consciousness—something that clinicians should take into account, not merely in the case of physical pathologies but especially in the case of mental disorders. Firstly, I will highlight three cases: schizophrenia, depression, and autism spectrum disorder. Then, I will show how these cases correspond to three different kinds of bodily existence: disembodiment (in the case of schizophrenia), chrematization (in melancholic depression), and dyssynchrony (in the autism spectrum disorder). Finally, I will argue for the importance of an “expressive common environment” between the patient and the clinician, who are two distinct, embodied conscious subjects resonating with one another. In this view, the primary goal of the therapeutic process seems to develop a shared understanding of the patient’s life-world, which finds its main expression through the disrupted body.