Tag-based spite with correlated interactions

We use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of harming behavior (spite) in settings involving both tags and (anti-) correlated interaction. Our results show an interesting interaction between these mechanisms. The presence of tags shows that pure spite is less likely to evolve when theore...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of theoretical biology Vol. 540; p. 111052
Main Authors Bruner, Justin P., Smead, Rory
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published England Elsevier Ltd 07.05.2022
Subjects
Biological Evolution
Cooperative Behavior
Evolution
Evolutionary game theory
Game Theory
Punishment
Social behavior
Spite
Evolution
Social behavior
Spite
Evolutionary game theory
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Summary:We use evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of harming behavior (spite) in settings involving both tags and (anti-) correlated interaction. Our results show an interesting interaction between these mechanisms. The presence of tags shows that pure spite is less likely to evolve when theoretically expected, but that conditional spite is more likely than expected. Moreover, we identify a novel tag-based equilibrium where spite occurs within but not between groups. We discuss implications for the evolution of spite, punishment, and the methodological approach of using exogenous parameters to represent (anti-) correlated interactions.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:0022-5193
1095-8541
DOI:10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111052