Equilibrium strategy based waste load allocation using simulated annealing optimization algorithm

This study focuses on development of equilibrium strategy based on simulated annealing (SA) algorithm for balancing economic and environmental concerns in waste load allocation (WLA) problem. To resolve conflicts among various stakeholders, including Iran Department of Environment (DoE) as governmen...

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Published inEnvironmental monitoring and assessment Vol. 192; no. 9; p. 612
Main Authors Saadatpour, Motahareh, Afshar, Abbas, Khoshkam, Helaleh, Prakash, Shwet
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 01.09.2020
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Algorithms
Atmospheric Protection/Air Quality Control/Air Pollution
Bargaining
Computer simulation
Conflicts
Dischargers
Earth and Environmental Science
Ecology
Economics
Ecotoxicology
Environment
Environmental Management
Environmental monitoring
Environmental science
Game theory
Games
Monitoring/Environmental Analysis
Optimization
Pollutant removal
Pollutants
Simulated annealing
Tariffs
Waste load
Wasteload allocation
Iran
Simulated annealing optimization Algorithm
Stackelberg game
QUAL2Kw
Optimum waste load allocation
Nash bargaining game
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Summary:This study focuses on development of equilibrium strategy based on simulated annealing (SA) algorithm for balancing economic and environmental concerns in waste load allocation (WLA) problem. To resolve conflicts among various stakeholders, including Iran Department of Environment (DoE) as governmental authority and industrial and municipal dischargers, Stackelberg and Nash bargaining games have been applied in this WLA problem and the results have been compared. SA algorithm has been coupled to QUAL2Kw model to derive optimal WLA program and the environmental penalty tariff (EPT) in Nash bargaining and Stackelberg games. The proposed tools and methodologies were illustrated in a case study of multi-stakeholders WLA problem in Gheshlagh River, Sanandaj, Kordestan, Iran. The results indicate that lower BOD removal rates are allocated to the pollutant dischargers in the Stackelberg game compared to the Nash bargaining game. Furthermore, the EPT assigned by Iran DoE in Stackelberg and Nash bargaining games are 11.25 and 3.6 Rials/(gr/month), respectively. The estimated EPT in the Stackelberg game is close to the current tariff (10 Rials/(gr/month)) specified by Iran DoE on impermissible BOD discharges.
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ISSN:0167-6369
1573-2959
DOI:10.1007/s10661-020-08567-w