Separable Games
Certain 2‐person oscilloscope‐based continuous games are known to give rise to dynamic behavior resembling that of the Prisoner's Dilemma game and other 2‐choice games. We explain this similarity of behavior in terms of structural equivalence between the 2‐person continuous games and a subset o...
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Published in | Behavioral Science Vol. 14; no. 2; pp. 121 - 132 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
California
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
01.03.1969
University of Michigan, Mental Health Research Institute |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Certain 2‐person oscilloscope‐based continuous games are known to give rise to dynamic behavior resembling that of the Prisoner's Dilemma game and other 2‐choice games. We explain this similarity of behavior in terms of structural equivalence between the 2‐person continuous games and a subset of all possible 2‐person, 2‐choice (2 × 2) games, called the separable games. A game is defined as separable if each player's payoff can be expressed as a sum of partial payoffs, each of which depends only on the strategy choice of one player. All separable games can be described in terms of the same two psychologically relevant parameters. They can be played in staggered, graduated, or continuous form. Non‐separable games, including “Chicken” and many other interesting games, cannot be staggered, and their graduated and continuous versions are subject to a reinterpretation. |
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Bibliography: | ark:/67375/WNG-CB16S7L3-6 The author wishes to thank Dr. Melvin Guyer for pointing out most of the relevant empirical literature, Professor Anatol Rapoport for counsel and inspiration, and Professor Seymour Rosenberg and other members of the Workshop on Mathematical Social Psychology (under the aegis of the Mathematical Social Sciences Board of the National Science Foundation) conducted in July, 1967, for helpful discussion. istex:856333D778C3AAB8CB53E989814F6F20B2C9172C ArticleID:BS3830140205 ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0005-7940 1099-1743 1932-300X |
DOI: | 10.1002/bs.3830140205 |