Propositions and the Objects of Thought

• Published in: Philosophical studies Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 47 - 62
• Main Author: Jubien, Michael
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Heidelberg Kluwer Academic Publishers 01.05.2001; Sringer; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Canines; Cognitive Processes; Constituent relations; Glues; Identity theory; Modal realism; Ontological pluralism; Ontology; Ordered pairs; Philosophical logics. Philosophy of language; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Platonism; Propositions; Swimming; Truth; Entity; Propositional Logic; Ontology; Platonism; Semantics; Intensionality; Value; Mathematics; Object; Representation; Truth; Thought
• ISSN: 0031-8116; 1573-0883
• DOI: 10.1023/A:1010361210072

[...]its entirely consistent to offer such a theory while rejecting genuine Platonic propositions. [...]we may read Bel(a,d,s,b) in a potentially illuminating way: a believes being a dog to be subextensive to barking. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not have before his mind a single object, Desdemonas love for Cassio, or that Desdemona loves Cassio, for that would require that there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of any minds; and this, though not logically refutable, is a theory to be avoided if possible. [...]it is easier to account for falsehood if we take judgement to be a relation in which the mind and the various objects concerned all occur severally; that is to say, Desdemona and loving and Cassio must all be terms in the relation which subsists when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio (p. 125). [...]I am grateful to Jeffrey King for many conversations on these and related topics.