Embedded game analysis and international conflict control

The use of game theoretic models for understanding international relations has been widely criticized. In this paper we suggest that the theory of embedded differential games with optimal control is a productive methodology for responding to the critics. Several noncooperative differential game mode...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inBehavioral Science Vol. 22; no. 1; pp. 22 - 31
Main Authors Gillespie, John V., Zinnes, Dina A.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published California John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 1977
University of Michigan, Mental Health Research Institute
Subjects
conflict control
embedded games analysis
game theoretic analysis
international relations
mathematical models
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Summary:The use of game theoretic models for understanding international relations has been widely criticized. In this paper we suggest that the theory of embedded differential games with optimal control is a productive methodology for responding to the critics. Several noncooperative differential game models with embedded objective functions are formulated. Concepts for obtaining undominated solutions based on the game structure, the quadratic objective functions and linear differential kinematic equations are discussed. The paper concludes that models with rich empirical reference can be formulated and productively used in understanding international conflict.
Bibliography:ArticleID:BS3830220104
Society for General Systems Research - No. 1976, 183-190
ark:/67375/WNG-R8QDZ685-0
istex:A666088E29AA9127ED454D8417586AAD62F2478D
The Center for International Policy Studies - No. 750-)514
National Science Foundation - No. SOC-75-04212
ISSN:0005-7940
1099-1743
1932-300X
DOI:10.1002/bs.3830220104