Investigative Support for Information Confidentiality Part I: Detecting Confidential Information Leakage via Protocol-based Covert Channels

This is Part I in a two-part series discussing the development of investigative support for information confidentiality. In this paper, we propose a technique to detect confidential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels based on relation algebra. It provides tests to verify the exis...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inProcedia computer science Vol. 34; pp. 276 - 285
Main Authors Jaskolka, Jason, Khedri, Ridha, Sabri, Khair Eddin
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 2014
Subjects
confidentiality
covert channels
formal methods
information leakage
covert channels
information leakage
confidentiality
formal methods
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Summary:This is Part I in a two-part series discussing the development of investigative support for information confidentiality. In this paper, we propose a technique to detect confidential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels based on relation algebra. It provides tests to verify the existence of an information leakage via a monitored covert channel as well as computations which show how the information was leaked if a leakage exists. We also report on a prototype tool that allows for the automation of the proposed technique. Our focus is limited to protocol-based covert channels and instances where covert channel users modulate the sent information by some form of encoding such as encryption.
ISSN:1877-0509
1877-0509
DOI:10.1016/j.procs.2014.07.023