Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and Change: Administrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos

The institutional development literature has begun to move beyond the concept of punctuated equilibrium and consider how the forces of stability and change interact. A central theme involves drift--the shifting of the effect of stable institutions through changing circumstances. This article uses th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPolitical research quarterly Vol. 61; no. 4; pp. 636 - 648
Main Author Barnes, Jeb
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA Sage Publications 01.12.2008
SAGE Publications
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Administrative courts
Asbestos
Business structures
Change
Court decisions
Courts
Criminal conversion
Defendants
Evolution
Injuries
Institutions
Litigation
Physical trauma
Policy making
Political Development
Political science
Reforms
Settlements & damages
Social policy
Stability
Tort law
Torts
United States
United States > US
institutional change
American political development
court—Congress relations
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Summary:The institutional development literature has begun to move beyond the concept of punctuated equilibrium and consider how the forces of stability and change interact. A central theme involves drift--the shifting of the effect of stable institutions through changing circumstances. This article uses the case of asbestos injury compensation to highlight how the very features of American government that make drift likely also promise to displace it, as courts step in when Congress fails to act. The broader implication is that drift is best understood as a transitional stage of development, not a dominant mode of change, in fragmented policy-making systems with multiple access points.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/1065912908317028