Metaphyiscal Nihilism and Necessary Being

This paper addresses the most fundamental question in metaphysics, Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is framed as a question about concrete entities, Why does a possible world containing concrete entities obtain rather than one containing no concrete entities? Traditional answ...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 40; no. 4; pp. 799 - 820
Main Author Goldschmidt, Tyron
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.12.2012
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Education
Epistemology
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Ethics
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Science
Cosmological argument
Necessary being
Metaphysical nihilism
Contingency
Knowledge theory
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Summary:This paper addresses the most fundamental question in metaphysics, Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is framed as a question about concrete entities, Why does a possible world containing concrete entities obtain rather than one containing no concrete entities? Traditional answers are in terms of there necessarily being some concrete entities, and include the possibility of a necessary being. But such answers are threatened by metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there being nothing concrete is possible, and the subtraction argument for this thesis, an argument that is the subject of considerable recent debate. I summarize and extend the debate about the argument, and answer the threat it poses, turning the tables on it to show how the subtraction argument supports a cosmological argument for a necessary being.
Bibliography:SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:0048-3893
1574-9274
DOI:10.1007/s11406-012-9362-9