There Is No Rawlsian Theory of Corporate Governance

• Published in: Business ethics quarterly Vol. 25; no. 1; pp. 65 - 92
• Main Author: Singer, Abraham
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Chicago Cambridge Journals on behalf of the Society for Business Ethics 01.01.2015; Cambridge University Press
• Subjects: Business ethics; Corporate governance; Democracy; Externality; Interpreters; Philosophy; Political philosophy; Political theory; Politics; Property rights; Rawls, John (1921-2002); Social responsibility; Special Section: Social Justice and the Corporation; Stakeholders; Stockholders; Strength; Theory
• ISSN: 1052-150X; 2153-3326
• DOI: 10.1017/beq.2015.1

The major aim of this article is to show that John Rawls's theory of justice cannot be applied effectively to questions of business ethics and corporate governance. I begin with a reading of Rawls that emphasizes both the critical and pragmatic nature of his theory. In the second section I look more closely at the notion of society's "basic structure" and its place within Rawls's theory. In the third section, I argue that "the corporation" cannot be understood as part of this basic structure and is not, therefore, a subject of justice for Rawls or his interpreters. Finally, I show that Rawls's inability to speak to the corporation is a weakness, regardless of one's particular view on the corporation. I conclude by considering what Rawls's theory helps us to understand about the problems involved in integrating corporate governance, business ethics, and political philosophy.