Metacognitive Feelings: A Predictive-Processing Perspective

• Published in: Perspectives on psychological science p. 17456916231221976
• Main Authors: Fernández Velasco, Pablo, Loev, Slawa
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States 29.01.2024
• Subjects: interoceptive inference; mental action; predictive processing; emotion; cognition; metacognitive feelings; affect; prediction
• ISSN: 1745-6916; 1745-6924
• DOI: 10.1177/17456916231221976

Metacognitive feelings are affective experiences that concern the subject's mental processes and capacities. Paradigmatic examples include the feeling of familiarity, the feeling of confidence, or the tip-of-the-tongue experience. In this article, we advance an account of metacognitive feelings based on the predictive-processing framework. The core tenet of predictive processing is that the brain is a hierarchical hypothesis-testing mechanism, predicting sensory input on the basis of prior experience and updating predictions on the basis of the incoming prediction error. According to the proposed account, metacognitive feelings arise out of a process in which visceral changes serve as cues to predict the error dynamics relating to a particular mental process. The expected rate of prediction-error reduction corresponds to the valence at the core of the emerging metacognitive feeling. Metacognitive feelings use prediction dynamics to model the agent's situation in a way that is both descriptive and directive. Thus, metacognitive feelings are not only an appraisal of ongoing cognitive performance but also a set of action policies. These action policies span predictive trajectories across bodily action, mental action, and interoceptive changes, which together transform the epistemic landscape within which metacognitive feelings unfold.