Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the yugoslav self-managed firm

The incentive properties of income-sharing arrangements are analyzed for situations in which workers are allowed to form group or coalition decisions on effort. Both the feasibility and enforceability of such decisions are shown to depend on a variety of organizational characteristics, including the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of Comparative Economics Vol. 3; no. 3; pp. 285 - 301
Main Author Tyson, Laura D'Andrea
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Elsevier Inc 01.09.1979
Elsevier
Academic Press
SeriesJournal of Comparative Economics
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Summary:The incentive properties of income-sharing arrangements are analyzed for situations in which workers are allowed to form group or coalition decisions on effort. Both the feasibility and enforceability of such decisions are shown to depend on a variety of organizational characteristics, including the degree of worker participation and the size and divisionalization of the firm. Finally, the recent decentralization of Yugoslav firms is shown to enhance the incentive effects of income sharing.
ISSN:0147-5967
1095-7227
DOI:10.1016/0147-5967(79)90030-1