Incentives, income sharing, and institutional innovation in the yugoslav self-managed firm
The incentive properties of income-sharing arrangements are analyzed for situations in which workers are allowed to form group or coalition decisions on effort. Both the feasibility and enforceability of such decisions are shown to depend on a variety of organizational characteristics, including the...
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Published in | Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 3; no. 3; pp. 285 - 301 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New York
Elsevier Inc
01.09.1979
Elsevier Academic Press |
Series | Journal of Comparative Economics |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | The incentive properties of income-sharing arrangements are analyzed for situations in which workers are allowed to form group or coalition decisions on effort. Both the feasibility and enforceability of such decisions are shown to depend on a variety of organizational characteristics, including the degree of worker participation and the size and divisionalization of the firm. Finally, the recent decentralization of Yugoslav firms is shown to enhance the incentive effects of income sharing. |
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ISSN: | 0147-5967 1095-7227 |
DOI: | 10.1016/0147-5967(79)90030-1 |