Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory

The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inWiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science Vol. 15; no. 1; pp. e1665 - n/a
Main Authors Sant’Anna, André, Michaelian, Kourken, Andonovski, Nikola
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hoboken, USA John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.01.2024
Subjects
autonoesis
Consciousness
episodic memory
episodicity
Humans
Memory, Episodic
Mental Recall
phenomenology
Philosophy
philosophy of memory
episodic memory
phenomenology
episodicity
philosophy of memory
autonoesis
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Summary:The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Philosophy > Consciousness Psychology > Memory Philosophical accounts of autonoesis.
ISSN:1939-5078
1939-5086
DOI:10.1002/wcs.1665