A methodological argument against scientific realism

First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 198; no. 3; pp. 2153 - 2167
Main Author Rowbottom, Darrell P.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2021
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Credibility
Cultural change
Dissertations & theses
Education
Epistemology
Historicism
Logic
Metaphysics
Methods
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Realism
Research methodology
Scientific method
Scientific realism
Theory change
Historical evidence
Scientific method
Confirmation
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Summary:First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-019-02197-7