Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms

We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPolitical science research and methods Vol. 10; no. 2; pp. 227 - 242
Main Authors Franchino, Fabio, Mariotto, Camilla
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.04.2022
Subjects
Accuracy
Bargaining
Councils
Economic policy
Eurozone
Governance
Government
Legislatures
Measurement errors
Original Article
Politics
Proposals
Reforms
Sovereign debt
Success
Legislative politics
Economic policy
European Union
Bargaining theory
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may be a reason for its commonly reported poorer accuracy. However, this model is more sensitive to measurement errors. We also show how both models contribute to understanding bargaining success and how the conditional influence of the European Parliament should not be ignored. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for our understanding of the EU.
ISSN:2049-8470
2049-8489
DOI:10.1017/psrm.2021.26